THE
Dan Smoot Report

Vol. 12, No. 5 (Broadcast 545) January 31, 1966 Dallas, Texas



DAN SMOOT

DISARMAMENT STORY — PART II

On July 14, 1962, American representatives at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva startled the world by reversing the American stand on the question of inspection and control. American officials had insisted that disarmament would not work without an *international* inspection and control system. The Soviets had insisted that existing *national* inspection and control systems would be adequate.[1,2]

On August 1, 1962, President John F. Kennedy offered to accept the Soviet proposal for a *national* inspection and control system, if the Soviets would accept the American principle of on-site inspections of unidentified seismic disturbances. The Soviets rejected the President's offer.[2,3]

President Kennedy tried again. On August 27, 1962, the United States (supported by Great Britain) proposed *two* new treaties written by the U. S. Disarmament Agency: (1) a treaty banning *all kinds* of nuclear tests, the ban to be policed by a *national* inspection and control system; (2) a treaty banning *certain types* of nuclear tests, with no verification or control system.[1,2,3]

The Soviets rejected both treaties, and proposed another uninspected moratorium on nuclear testing to begin January 1, 1963.[1,2,3] They were nearing completion of another series of tests and wanted to call time-out (as they had done in October, 1958) for study and evaluation.[4]

On September 22, 1962, the Soviets proposed a disarmament plan strikingly similar to plans already submitted by the United States. The Soviet proposal accepts the principle of international inspection and control; the strengthening of the UN into a formidable world body to control all armaments and police forces; and the formation of a UN armed force to be composed of local units maintained in their own countries until called up by the UN high command. The Soviet plan requires a test-ban treaty and a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.[2,3]

The United States rejected the Soviet proposal of September 22, 1962; but President Kennedy said the U. S. would ban nuclear tests beginning January 1, 1963 (as the Soviets had requested),

THE DAN SMOOT REPORT, a magazine published every week by The Dan Smoot Report, Inc., mailing address P. O. Box 9538, Lakewood Station, Dallas, Texas 75214; Telephone TAylor 1-2303 (office address 6441 Gaston Avenue). Subscription rates: $10.00 a year, $6.00 for 6 months, $18.00 for two years. For first class mail $12.50 a year; by airmail (including APO and FPO) $14.50 a year. Reprints of specific issues: 1 copy for 25¢; 6 for $1.00; 50 for $5.50; 100 for $10.00—each price for bulk mailing to one person. Texans add 2% for sales tax on reprints, books, and records ordered for Texas delivery.

Copyright by Dan Smoot, 1966. Second Class mail privilege authorized at Dallas, Texas
No Reproductions Permitted.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

if an effective agreement could be made by then.[3,4]

There followed a long series of American appeals to the Soviets to agree upon a nuclear test-ban treaty.[3,4]

While testing and developing nuclear weapons, the Soviets kept agitating for a test-ban treaty. When the Kremlin position would "harden," President Kennedy would order preparations of new American nuclear tests; but, before our tests occurred, the Kremlin position would "soften," and President Kennedy would suspend plans for American testing — all of this, of course, at enormous cost to American taxpayers, since complicated programs of nuclear testing cannot be turned on and off like water taps. This vacillation continued until June, 1963, when President Kennedy stopped all plans for American nuclear tests, indefinitely.[3,4]

On July 25, 1963, W. Averell Harriman signed, in Moscow, a nuclear test-ban treaty with the Soviets and the British.[3] The Senate ratified the treaty on September 19, 1963, though many Senators who voted for ratification admitted that the Soviets could not be trusted to keep their pledges.[5]

The treaty (prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space, but permitting underground nuclear tests) is made to order for the Soviets. The Soviets' high-yield testing in the atmosphere since 1958 is believed to have produced plenty of research information to develop missiles and missile killers. The Soviets need, however, to continue underground nuclear testing to develop tactical weapons.[4]

The United States, on the other hand, has done no testing of high-yield nuclear weapons since 1954; and the test-ban treaty (according to the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee) prohibits us from conducting critically needed research (which the Soviets, it is assumed, have already conducted), such as:

Testing the vulnerability of our missile-launching systems to high-yield nuclear explosions;

Testing the vulnerability of missile warheads and nose cones to nuclear explosions during atmospheric re-entry;

Studying atmospheric and high altitude radar blackout phenomena;

Studying communications blackout phenomena which result from high-yield nuclear explosions;

Making full-scale operational tests of anti-ballistic systems;

Developing high-yield warheads equal to those the Soviets already have;

Testing the effects of high-yield nuclear weapons;

Testing underwater nuclear weapons for improved antisubmarine defense;

Making full-scale performance and reliability tests of our Minuteman and Titan missiles systems (the keystones of our present early warning and continental defense, whose operational effectiveness is unknown because never fully tested);

Testing the yield and effectiveness of our largest stockpiled weapons;

Conducting troop training tactical exercises in the use of nuclear weapons.[6]

Prior to Senate ratification of the test-ban treaty, Dr. Edward Teller (known as father of the Hydrogen Bomb) said:

"A test ban treaty with the Soviet Union would prevent vital improvements of our atomic explosives as well as foreclose the development of antimissiles and systems like Nike-Zeus and Nike-X. It would not keep the Russians from cheating. Such a treaty, in sum, would endanger our security and help the Soviet Union in its plan to conquer the world."[7]

On November 18, 1963, *U. S. News & World Report* published an article entitled "New Policy Line for U.S.—Togetherness With Russia." This was the American public's first information about the Phoenix Study, a 141-page document prepared (at taxpayers' expense) by the Institute for Defense Analysis, for the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The full title of the Phoenix Study is *Common Action for the Control of Conflict: An Approach to the Problem of International Tensions and Arms Control.* It was completed on July 18, 1963, when 300 copies were quietly distributed to key government officials, including members of the U. S. team then negotiating the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

test-ban treaty in Moscow. President Kennedy followed, and President Johnson is following, policy outlined in the Phoenix Study.[8]

Here are excerpts from the *U. S. News & World Report* article:

"Strategy of the U. S. in dealing with Soviet Russia is in process of sharp change . . . . At the heart of the new strategy is this plan: Seek a *detente*—a period of relaxation or informal truce —during which an 'interdependence' between the U. S. and the Soviet Union can be established . . . .

"Whether Khrushchev will co-operate to further this trend remains to be seen . . . .

"A blueprint for the latest American strategy . . . is provided by [the Phoenix Study] . . . . Special attention is being given to the . . . study because of two recent speeches by President Kennedy—one at the University of Maine on October 19, and an earlier one at American University . . . June 10. In these speeches, and in other statements, President Kennedy appears to have followed closely the policy line suggested by the new paper on control of conflict . . . .

"Emphasis is placed by the new strategy on a search for areas where the U. S. and Russia can join in common action. The atomic test-ban treaty is one such area on which agreement has been reached. Emphasis upon increased trade is another. The 'hot line' teleprinters between the White House . . . and the Kremlin . . . are still another. The 'pen pal' letters — of which there have been at least 40 — between Krushchev and Kennedy represent another searching action . . . .

"One Congressman [Glenard P. Lipscomb] who had studied the [Phoenix] report said that [its policy of interdependence and togetherness with the Soviets] . . . amounts to 'feeding Communism . . . with one hand while we fight Communism with our other hand in Vietnam.' . . ."

Alice Widener, editor and publisher of *U.S.A.*, devoted four issues of her magazine to the Phoenix Study. Here in essence are a *few* of the Phoenix Study recommendations:[9]

■ **The United States should begin disarmament immediately, without even an informal commitment from the Soviets. Presumably, this would encourage them to disarm.**

■ **The President should encourage disarmament of the United States by advocating a tax cut. Americans might not approve tax reduction for disarmament. So, the President should deceive them—lead them to believe *economy* is the objective. With the Soviets, however, the President should be honest, letting them know that he cuts taxes to reduce defense spending.**

■ **The United States should help the Soviet Union catch up with us, economically, industrially, and agriculturally—because, presumably, when the Soviets no longer envy or fear our superiority, tensions will ease.**

■ **The United States should restrain its allies from starting conflicts, hopeful that the Soviets would reciprocate.**

■ **The President should seek "tacit" agreements with the Soviets about disarmament, restraint of allies, interdependence—but should not bind them with "open" formal agreements. The reason, apparently: if formal agreements are made and Soviet leaders welsh, the U. S. would lose face unless it took an anti-Soviet position and denounced communist treachery. This would create more tensions and impair the policy of friendly togetherness. If Soviet leaders are not required to make *specific* commitments, and if the world knows nothing about their "tacit" agreements, the President will not be forced to denounce the Soviets and thereby create tensions.**

■ ***"The United States should accept the need for a dual policy of collaboration and conflict as a significant improvement over unmitigated conflict."*** **As I read it, this recommendation in the Phoenix Study means that we should continue the policy of giving direct aid to communist countries, and of "collaborating" with them in any other way possible, while at the same time "accepting" the policy of fighting "limited" wars against communism, as in Korea, Laos, and Vietnam. I feel there is even a hint that such "limited" wars might be *arranged*, to keep the world perpetually scared about the danger of all-out war—conditioned to question nothing which Moscow and Washington may do to achieve "relaxation of tensions."[9]**

Alice Widener relates circumstances strongly indicating that the Phoenix Study was (to some degree) an outgrowth of various Pugwash Conferences arranged and financed by Cyrus Eaton, wealthy American industrialist widely known as pro-Soviet. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee has reported that the Pugwash Conferences

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were initiated, in part, by communists and pro-communists; that they have served to discredit the United States while supporting the Soviet Union; that their proceedings, though never made public in the United States, have been reported in full to the Kremlin.[9]

The test-ban treaty of 1963 having fulfilled one of two basic requirements in the Soviet's latest proposal for disarmament, the U. S. government in 1965 proposed another treaty which would fulfill the other Soviet requirement. On August 17, 1965, William C. Foster, U. S. delegate to the Geneva Disarmament Conference and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, presented a Draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. Announcing this fact, President Johnson said:

"President Kennedy . . . . constructed the nuclear test ban treaty [of 1963], the first hopeful, helpful step in the long journey toward peace.

"Now we continue that journey today in Geneva."[10]

The proposed new treaty provides, among other things, that international control of nuclear weapons shall be enforced by the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency.[10] This agency has been controlled by communists since 1957.[11]

On October 18, 1965, it was announced that NATO nations and Japan had agreed to sell atomic reactors to communist nations for peaceful uses, under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.[12]

On October 27, William C. Foster said that U. S. proposals for disarmament and for prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons would involve destruction of thousands of U.S. nuclear weapons.[13]

The American press paid little attention to the new treaty proposed by the United States in 1965; but, in Germany, Dr. Konrad Adenauer denounced it roundly, calling it "atrocious, dangerous and basically false, so monstrous and so terrible that in the long view it delivers Europe into the hands of the Russians."[14]

In November, 1965, the White House Conference on International Cooperation made formal reports to President Johnson. The Conference was organized in 1964. Among the committees which the President appointed to study international cooperation was one on Arms Control and Disarmament, composed of such people as Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner (former scientific advisor to President Kennedy and to President Johnson), Roswell L. Gilpatric (former Deputy Secretary of Defense), Harold Stassen and Frederick M. Eaton (both disarmament advisors under Eisenhower). Wiesner, Gilpatric, Stassen, and Eaton (like most leading disarmament advocates) are members of the Council on Foreign Relations.[15]

In late November, 1965, this White House Conference Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament submitted a report to the President, recommending, among other things:

—a three-year moratorium on the production of an anti-missile missiles system;

—drastic cuts in U. S. and U.S.S.R. fleets of missiles and bombers;

—diversion of part of the U. S. defense budget to the United Nations to finance a UN army;

—de-emphasis of U. S. ties with West Europe, and emphasis on closer ties between the U. S., the Soviet Union, and communist China;

—direct disarmament talks between the U. S. and communist China;

—U. S. assistance to get communist China in the United Nations;

—de-emphasis of U. S. military alliances which provoke or disturb the Soviets.[15]

Many disarmament advocates assert that stressing nuclear power leaves us the all-or-nothing choice of fighting total, nuclear war, or not fighting at all. They say we should have balanced forces—enough nuclear power to deter the Soviets from initiating nuclear war, enough conventional military power to fight limited, "brush fire" wars. At the same time, they recommend that we disarm ourselves of nuclear power, unilaterally—not even maintaining deterrent power—and refrain from building defenses against nuclear weapons, in the hope that the Soviets will follow our lead. More-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over, while gradually disarming the nation of nuclear power, our political leaders have failed to maintain conventional forces adequate for the limited wars in which they keep us involved. This condition was briefly discussed in the January 3, 1966, issue of this *Report*, "What We Should Do In Vietnam," which presented some of the evidence of accelerated buildup of communist strength in Vietnam, at a time when our men do not always have adequate, or sufficient, conventional weapons and supplies. Senator Richard B. Russell (Georgia Democrat, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee), commented on the same problem, during an interview with the staff of *U. S. News & World Report*, published September 6, 1965. Senator Russell said:

"I doubt very much that our conventional position for warfare is as good as it was a year ago.

"We've drawn down our reserves considerably to take care of the situation in Vietnam and other places. We've sent supplies down into the Congo, for example, and to other trouble spots.

"Our conventional forces were well-equipped in about 1962, but they've been drawn down since then . . . ."

Defense Department negligence in guaranteeing uninterrupted flow of conventional war materials to our soldiers in Vietnam was revealed on December 1, 1965, when three unions (International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO; and Western Employees Trades Council) struck the Olin Mathieson Company chemical plant at East Alton, Illinois. This plant is the *sole producer of gunpowder for many weapons which our troops are using in Vietnam.*[17]

Pentagon officials said the strike posed a serious threat to our fighting men, and ordered reactivation of another plant to produce the critically needed gunpowder. The new plant cannot be in operation, however, before June or July, 1966.[17]

President Johnson—quick to rebuke and punish steel companies for increasing prices—remained calm and detached about the Olin Mathieson strike, which endangered the lives of Americans in battle. Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz pleaded for a settlement, which was reached on December 30, 1965. The strike stopped; but no one knows when a union may again shut down a critical defense installation.

The following is from an article in *The New York Times*, written at Saigon on December 17, 1965, by James Reston:

" 'Despite our victories,' one high officer said here yesterday, 'the force ratios are running against us. They [communists] are replacing fighting units faster than we are. They are sending cadres of regular North Vietnamese officers and technicians to form new units out of the Vietcong, and at the present kill-rate this war could go on forever.' "

On December 29, 1965, *The Dallas Morning News* published a column by Joseph H. Brooks (Copley News Service), just returned from Vietnam. Here are excerpts from the column:

"Some time back, I observed that the Vietnamese army was superbly equipped with U. S. war equipment. The Vietnamese had all the uniforms, small arms, artillery pieces, trucks, Jeeps, tanks, and the like that they could possibly use.

"At the same time, however, U. S. forces were making do with what looked like leftovers. At Da Nang, the Air Force had to rent broken-down Jeeps from a local private business. The Air Force took B57's away from the Vietnamese air national guard to get enough to fight with.

"U. S. Marines around Da Nang were clamoring for jungle boots . . . . There were not to be issued, they were told.

"Outside the Da Nang Air Base, though, I saw jungle boots for sale in the little shops along the road."

Secretary of Defense McNamara has advocated the balanced-forces theory, which requires the maintenance of conventional forces for fighting "brush-fire" wars, and the minimizing of nuclear forces for all-out war. Yet, in December, 1965, when McNamara announced the phasing out of manned bombers in our Strategic Air Command, he indicated heavier reliance on unmanned missiles. None of the missiles on which we are to rely, however, have ever been fired with nuclear warheads; and we are now prohibited by the 1963

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

test-ban treaty from testing them with nuclear warheads. Moreover, the Defense Department is presently selling, at public auction, missile-launching sites installed a few years ago in key locations throughout the United States to protect our major cities and critical industries.[18]

Our present enemies are communist nations, greatly superior to us in numbers of men for conventional military forces. They cannot match us, however, in the technology and industrial capability necessary for producing and maintaining decisive, sophisticated weapons and systems of war. Consequently, the liberal recommendation that we emphasize conventional military power at the expense of nuclear power is tailor-made to give our enemies a stupendous advantage over us: we refrain from maximum use of our superior technology and industrial capability, while competing with numerically-superior nations in the mobilization of manpower.

When we fight "limited wars" with "conventional forces," we impose disastrous handicaps on our own fighting men, none on our enemies.

No matter how valorous, well-trained, well-led, and well-equipped an army may be, it cannot fight with maximum effectiveness, and provide maximum safety for itself, unless it has a clear and unmistakable mission. The only mission that makes complete sense to a fighting army is the mission to win, to achieve total victory over the enemy. In war, as the late great General Douglas MacArthur said, there is no substitute for victory. In a limited war, our enemies have the advantage of knowing precisely what their mission is: victory over the United States. Having no such clear objective, our side fights under the enormous handicap of uncertainty — never knowing precisely what it is fighting for.

This dangerous, debilitating uncertainty is clearly reflected by President Johnson, in connection with our present limited war in Vietnam. In a score of speeches and statements during 1965, President Johnson tried vainly to explain what we are doing in Vietnam. Note, for example, the President's speech on July 29, 1965. He began by quoting a letter from a mother who asked why American boys are being sent to Vietnam. The President said, "I have tried to answer that question a dozen times and more." He tried again, repeating what he had already said "a dozen times and more." If the commander in chief finds it utterly impossible to explain the mission of our fighting men, can the men themselves comprehend it?

As early as 1917, international communists began to use worldwide disarmament propaganda as a weapon against non-communist nations, particularly the United States. To communists, *worldwide disarmament* does not mean elimination from the world of all weapons of war. It means taking all weapons away from non-communists so that they cannot resist communism.

Lenin said, and later communist leaders have repeated, that communists are contemptuous of pacifism, but can effectively use pacifists in non-communist nations.

Pacifists believe that war is horrible; and it is. Pacifists, however, are unwilling to accept reality. *Reality* is that wars are inevitable until human beings are better than they have ever been since the dawn of history.

Suppose non-communist nations *could* make an agreement with communist dictators which resulted in actual worldwide elimination of all modern weapons of war. What would then prevent lawless hordes from overunning the civilized world with primitive weapons?

To avoid such a catastrophe, why not disarm all nations, but at the same time arm an international authority to keep the peace? This would be worse than total disarmament *without* an armed authority to enforce order. Any agency with enough authority to police the world, and with a weapons monopoly, can enslave the world.

Men will become "good" enough to refrain from warring on each other only when, and if, all men accept for themselves the saving grace that God offers. Meanwhile, it behooves all civilized nations to maintain whatever weapons are necessary to protect their civilization against all threats, within or without.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee is still holding meetings at Geneva, considering U. S. and U.S.S.R. disarmament proposals. The proposals are now very similar, differing only in details.

It is not likely, however, that one general worldwide disarmament treaty will be agreed upon. The more likely prospect is that our government will negotiate several agreements, each (like the 1963 test-ban treaty) providing for specific, limited disarmament. Meanwhile, our political leaders will continue disarming the United States unilaterally. Our leaders seem to be motivated either by hope that communists will follow our lead and disarm their nations — or by conviction that the safest course for us is gradual, peaceful surrender, because they think we could not win a nuclear war.

In the congressional elections of 1966, the American people *could* elect enough constitutional conservatives to stop the drive toward disarmament and surrender of the United States.

Congressional Fund

At the request of subscribers, we keep all members of the United States Congress—both House and Senate—on a permanent subscription list. We do this at our expense; and since the cost is rather high, we make this announcement each year, inviting contributions to help carry the load.

Your contributions to us for this purpose are not tax-exempt; and we can no longer use a specific contribution to provide a subscription for specific Representatives or Senators. Any sum that you send will be placed in our general Congressional Fund to help pay the over-all expense — and will be sincerely appreciated, because it is needed.

FOOTNOTES

(1) *Second Annual Report to Congress, January* 1, 1962-*December* 31, 1962, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 14, February, 1963, 102 pp.

(2) *International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, September* 1961-*September* 1962, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 9, October, 1962, 333 pp.

(3) *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 19, November, 1963, 1363 pp.; *Documents on Disarmament*, 1963, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 24, October, 1964, 740 pp.; *Documents on Disarmament*, 1964, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 27, October, 1965, 597 pp.

(4) *The Test Ban: An American Strategy of Gradual Self-Mutilation*, by Stefan T. Possony, *Congressional Record*, March 21, 1963, pp. 4358-70 (daily)

(5) For information on the stated stands of various U. S. Senators, see the debates on the Test Ban Treaty in the Senate, *Congressional Records* of September 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, and 19, 1963.

(6) Report of the Preparedness Subcommittee of the U. S. Senate Armed Services Committee (often called the Stennis Committee), *Congressional Record*, September 13, 1963, pp. 16072-5 (daily)

(7) *Congressional Record*, September 16, 1963, p. 16219 (daily)

(8) "Communism," speech by U. S. Representative Glenard P. Lipscomb (Rep., Calif.), *Congressional Record*, February 10, 1964, pp. 2720-4 (daily)

(9) *U.S.A. Magazine* is published every other week at 530 East 72nd Street, New York, New York 10021; subscription $20.00 a year. The December 13 and 27, 1963 and April 17 and May 1, 1964 issues were combined into two discussions of the Phoenix Study. My conclusions are based on extensive quotations from the study published in *U.S.A.*

(10) *To Prevent The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 26, September, 1965, 16 pp.

(11) "Reds Grab Key Jobs In World Agency," by Robert S. Allen, *The Tablet*, Brooklyn, N.Y., November 2, 1957, and *The Birmingham News*, November 3, 1957; "Expensive Bargain," by Seymour Freidin, *New York Post Magazine*, January 22, 1961, p. 7; editorial, *The New York Daily News*, October 7, 1961, p. 9

(12) AP from London, *The Dallas Morning News*, October 19, 1965, p. 2A

(13) Article by Sam Pope Brewer of the New York Times News Service, *The Dallas Morning News*, October 28, 1965, p. 3A

(14) "West Germany," *Time*, September 3, 1965, p. 30

(15) "3-Year Moratorium Urged On an Antimissile Missile," by Robert Kleinman, *The New York Times*, November 24, 1965, pp. 1, 4; Nuclear Genie and the Bottle," by Alice Widener, *U.S.A.*, December 10 and 24, 1965 (see footnote 9 for details on *U.S.A.*)

(16) "Top Scientist on the New Frontier," by John W. Finney, *The New York Times Magazine*, September 3, 1961, pp. 8 ff.

(17) AP from Washington, *The Dallas Morning News*, December 30, 1965, p. 2A

(18) For details on Secretary McNamara and his policies, see this *Report*, "Are We Afraid To Defend Ourselves?", January 17, 1966.

WHO IS DAN SMOOT?

Born in Missouri, reared in Texas, Dan Smoot went to SMU getting BA and MA degrees, 1938 and 1940. In 1941, he joined the faculty at Harvard as a Teaching Fellow, doing graduate work for a doctorate in American civilization. From 1942 to 1951, he was an FBI agent: three and a half years on communist investigations; two years on FBI headquarters staff; almost four years on general FBI cases in various places. He resigned from the FBI and, from 1951 to 1955, was commentator on national radio and television programs, giving *both* sides of controversial issues. In July, 1955, he started his present profit-supported, free-enterprise business: publishing *The Dan Smoot Report*, a weekly magazine available by subscription; and producing a weekly news-analysis radio and television broadcast, available for sponsorship by reputable business firms, as an advertising vehicle. The *Report* and broadcast give *one* side of important issues: the side that presents documented truth using the American Constitution as a yardstick. If you think Smoot's materials are effective against socialism and communism, you can help immensely — help get subscribers for the *Report*, commercial sponsors for the broadcast.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The First and Only Printing of . . .

THE DAN SMOOT REPORT...BOUND VOL. XI (1965)

This volume contains all 52 issues of the *Report* published in 1965. Nowhere else on earth can you get such a readable and concise — yet thoroughly documented and comprehensive — collection of facts and commentary on the great political, economic, and social issues that troubled the world in the Year of Our Lord, 1965.



BOUND VOLUME XI . . . $10.00

Size: 8½ x 11¼

Binding: Maroon Fabrikoid, with gold lettering (matches editions of previous years)

Contents: More than 400 pages of documented research, plus table of contents and comprehensive index

Price: $10.00, postage prepaid ($10.20 for orders in Texas for Texas delivery)

AN EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR USE IN THE 1966 congressional elections and in the continuing job of public education on the great issues of our time, the 1965 BOUND VOLUME contains roll call votes of all members of Congress during 1965, the ratings that members earned by the votes they cast, and penetrating discussions on such subjects as:

Vietnam ** Dominican Republic ** South Africa ** The Congo Tragedy ** Nationalizing Education ** Metropolitan Government ** Communist Student Riots ** The Great Society ** Civil Rights ** Social Security ** Federal Farm Programs ** Earl Warren Court ** Firearms Legislation ** Immigration Problems ** Labor Laws ** Right to Work ** Communizing America.

GIVE THE 1965 BOUND VOLUME TO OTHERS . . . It will be an invaluable gift for teachers, students, writers, speakers — or for *anyone* who needs to be informed on the major issues of our day.

We will mail the Bound Volumes to your gift list, and pay the postage ourselves; or, we will ship them to you in sealed cartons so that you can mail them to others by merely adding address and postage.

A limited number of the 1965 Volume was bound, and the Volume cannot be reprinted. Volumes for 1962, 1963, and 1964 are still available (at $10.00 each); but Volumes for all years prior to 1962 are sold out.

ORDER FORM

YOUR NAME:_____

STREET:_____

CITY AND STATE:_____

THE DAN SMOOT REPORT
P. O. BOX 9538
DALLAS, TEXAS 75214

_____**Copies of BOUND VOLUME XI (1965) @ $10.00 each*** _____**Check Enclosed**

***($10.20 each for orders in Texas for Texas delivery)**

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED